Do you have a legal query?
In H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech (2025), the Supreme Court of India ruled that a cheque bounce complaint under Section 138 NI Act filed beyond 30 days without a delay-condonation application is not maintainable.
Published by BLJ Legal | Expert Cheque Bounce Advocates| 19th September, 2025
The Supreme Court of India, in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. MSN Woodtech, Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2002 of 2025), decided on 09 September 2025, has laid down an important principle regarding limitation in cheque bounce cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
The Court held that a complaint filed beyond the statutory limitation period of 30 days cannot be entertained unless a written application for condonation of delay under Section 142(b) NI Act is filed. Without such an application, summons cannot be issued, and the complaint is liable to be quashed.
The dispute arose when M/s MSN Woodtech filed a complaint against H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd., along with its directors, H.S. Oberoi and Manveer Singh Oberoi, alleging that a cheque issued by the company had been dishonoured. The complaint was filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
However, there was a crucial procedural lapse: the complaint reached the court five days after the expiry of the 30-day limitation period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the NI Act. Importantly, the complainant did not file a separate application for condonation of delay, which the law requires when the limitation period is exceeded.
Despite this, the Trial Court went ahead and issued summons to the accused, treating the complaint as though it had been filed within time. When the appellants challenged this, the Delhi High Court, in its order dated 21 November 2024, upheld the Trial Court’s approach. The High Court reasoned that the delay could still be condoned even if there was no formal application.
The appellants then approached the Supreme Court of India through a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 2002 of 2025, later converted into a criminal appeal. They argued that the law makes the 30-day limit mandatory, and without a written application explaining the delay, the complaint itself was not maintainable. On 09 September 2025, a two-judge Bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice K. Vinod Chandran delivered the ruling that now sets the standard for courts handling limitation in cheque bounce cases.
Whether a complaint filed beyond the 30-day limitation period under Section 138 NI Act is maintainable without a delay-condonation application?
Whether the High Court was correct in holding that filing such an application is not mandatory?
The Supreme Court’s ruling in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech (2025) centered on the interpretation of Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
“Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138:
Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.
The Supreme Court interpreted Sections 138 and 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act strictly, holding that limitation under Section 138 is mandatory and cannot be bypassed by any presumption. Where a complaint is filed after the 30-day limitation period prescribed by the statute, the court must first examine whether a written application for condonation of delay under Section 142(b) has been made, disclosing sufficient cause for the delay. The absence of such an application deprives the Court of jurisdiction to take cognizance and issue summons—even if the delay is minor (in this case, five days). The Court found that the Trial Court’s assumption that the complaint was within time, and the High Court’s view that condonation could be implied without an application, were both erroneous. In sum, the Court reaffirmed that limitation is not a procedural formality but a substantive requirement, and condonation of delay is not optional but must be sought through proper statutory application before the court proceeds with issuing summons or further criminal proceedings.
“Once the statute prescribes a mandatory time limit for filing a complaint, there cannot be any deviation from the same except when an application accompanying the complaint is filed seeking condonation disclosing reasons for the delay and even then it is obligatory on the part of the Court to take note of such filing beyond limitation and to consider the reasons disclosed independently and to come to a judicious conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of that case condonation is justified.”
— Supreme Court, H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech, Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2002 of 2025), decided on 09.09.2025
The power to condone delay under Section 142(b) NI Act is statutory, not inherent.
No presumption of condonation can be made by the Magistrate unless the complainant files a proper application disclosing sufficient cause for delay.
Since criminal liability under Section 138 is penal in nature, strict compliance with statutory limitation is mandatory.
Thus, a time-barred complaint without a delay-condonation application is not maintainable, and summons issued in such cases are liable to be quashed.
The Supreme Court emphasized that once the NI Act prescribes a mandatory time frame, courts cannot presume condonation of delay.
The Court clarified that condonation of delay requires a formal application or affidavit disclosing reasons. Without it, courts cannot proceed to take cognizance or issue summons.
The Trial Court erred by assuming the complaint was within limitation.
The High Court wrongly held that condonation was possible without an application.
The Court clarified that this ruling will not affect any civil recovery proceedings initiated by the complainant for the cheque amount.
The Supreme Court in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. MSN Woodtech, Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2002 of 2025) held that a complaint filed beyond the 30-day limitation under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not maintainable unless a written application for condonation of delay under Section 142(b) is filed. As no such application was submitted in this case, the Trial Court and Delhi High Court orders were set aside, and the complaint was quashed.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. MSN Woodtech strengthens cheque bounce litigation under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by emphasizing strict adherence to statutory limitation. Complainants must ensure complaints are filed within the 30-day limitation period, or a formal application for condonation of delay under Section 142(b) with sufficient reasons must be submitted to maintain validity. For accused persons, the judgment provides protection against time-barred or defective complaints, preventing unwarranted criminal proceedings. Courts are now required to verify the limitation period and the existence of a proper condonation application before issuing summons, thereby upholding procedural fairness, statutory compliance, and transparency in cheque bounce prosecutions.
The complaint must be filed within 30 days from the date of cause of action (after the statutory 15-day notice period).
Yes, under Section 142(b) NI Act, but only when a written application is filed showing sufficient cause.
Yes. Without a formal application, the Court cannot assume condonation of delay.
The complaint becomes non-maintainable, and summons issued on such a complaint are liable to be quashed.
No. Civil suits for recovery of money remain unaffected by this judgment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech (2025) is a landmark ruling that reinforces the mandatory nature of limitation under Section 138 NI Act. It provides clarity to litigants and lower courts by holding that delay cannot be condoned automatically and requires a written application. This ensures fairness, transparency, and procedural compliance in cheque bounce prosecutions.
Dealing with a cheque bounce can involve complex legal procedures and strict statutory timelines. Our team at BLJ Legal provides professional guidance on Section 138 NI Act complaints, helping you understand your rights, evaluate legal options, and navigate procedural requirements. Whether you are filing a complaint or defending against a time-barred or defective case, we offer strategic support to ensure your matter is handled efficiently and in accordance with the law.
📍 Address: Chamber No. 314, Patiala House Courts Complex, Purana Quila Rd, near India Gate, New Delhi, Delhi 110001
📞 Phone: 8851632512
📧 Email: legalblj@gmail.com
Disclaimer: This message is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or a solicitation of services.
-Adv. Shasha Jain, BLJ Legal
